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Abstract
This paper reviews Thomas Pikettys Capital in the Twenty-First Century.
Pikettys Capital seeks to bring the issue of inequality back to the centre
of social analysis and to encourage discussion about the evolution of wealth
and inequality with a view to inform policy. The book uses data stretching
as far back as the 1700s. The main thesis of the book is that capitalism
automatically generates inequality and wealth concentration since the rate
of return on capital always exceeds the growth rate of income. To resolve
this problem, the book proposes a progressive tax on wealth and income. I
show that Pikettys book is based on a misunderstanding of classical political
economy, particularly Marx. Pikettys view of the development and phases
of capitalism is inadequate. His tax proposals, though progressive, will not
resolve the inequality problem. Lastly, his conclusion that modern economic
growth made it possible to avoid the Marxist apocalypse is not borne out by
his data.
Keywords: Capital, inequality, wealth concentration, falling rate of prot.
1. Introduction
Thomas Pikettys Capital in the Twenty-First Century has captured the
imagination of many scholars, policymakers, students, etc. Its main objec-
tives are to put the issue of inequality at the centre of social analysis and
policy discussion and to open a democratic debate about the evolution of
wealth and inequality, informed by data. The book is based on data stretch-
ing as far as the 1700s, which shows the evolution of capital, income and the
split between capital income and labour income.
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The main thrust of the book is that capitalism automatically generates wealth
concentration and inequality because the rate of return on capital is greater
than the growth rate of income (r > g). The implication of this is that
capital tends to increase relative to income (i.e. the capital-income ratio
denoted by  in the book, tends to increase) which, in the long run, is not
sustainable. This increase in the capital-income ratio leads to a fall in the
rate of return on capital, which leads to a slowdown in economic growth. In
order to avoid this "Marxist apocalypse", Piketty proposes a redistributive
tax on prots and wealth (or capital), within the context where the economy
is dominated by the forces of private property and competition.
It should be clear from the start that Piketty does not want to abolish cap-
italism. He proposes "deep structural reforms" that will not fundamentally
alter the dominance of private property relations. In this regard, Piketty
follows the line of a great heritage of reformers which includes Keynes and
the social democrats. However within social democracy, Pikettys solutions
are more on the right social democratic spectrum rather than the left. The
left social democrats at least had the courage to observe that the tendency
of capitalism towards crisis cannot be resolved without some degree of state-
ownership of capital. In Piketty, none of this is mentioned. Instead, he
proposes a series of taxes and social spending ostensibly designed to arrest
the tendency of  to rise.
In this review, I show that Piketty has a misunderstanding of the classics,
particularly Ricardo and Marx, about whom he makes claims in his book.
Piketty casts doubts on the scientic status of Marxs Capital by stating that
Marx, driven by the political agenda he articulated in the Communist Man-
ifesto, made "hasty pronouncements from which it was di¢ cult to escape"
(Piketty, p.10). He also makes unfounded claims that Marx, together with
Ricardo and Malthus, talked about inequality "without citing any sources
whatsoever". This is to justify the point Piketty made earlier that, in rela-
tion to inequality, all along there has been "debate without data" (p.2).
In order to distinguish his book from Marxs, Piketty seems compelled at
each stage, when he refers to Marx, not to forget mentioning how, despite
Marxs brilliant intuitions, he nevertheless was, "in a way", wrong. This type
of approach to intellectual predecessors, might be useful, only if it does not
fraudulently present the views that it critiques. Unfortunately, Piketty cre-
ates a fraudulent Marx (and Ricardo) that he criticises. In addition, instead
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of giving genuine credit to Marx for having used income tax statistics long
before Kuznets, Piketty decides to ignore Marx and gives credit to Kuznets.
I argue that Piketty does not have to unnecessarily criticise Marx in order
to enhance the intellectual contribution of his book. Instead creating the
positive links between his work and that of the classical political economists
would enhance his book, especially when read as a supplement to Marxs
Capital, because of the richness of the data he uses.
Thus, in this review, I will focus on a) Pikettys relation to classical political
economy, b) his view on the origins and phases of capitalism, c) his laws of
capitalism and how they are related to Marxs "laws of motion" of capital-
ism, d) his tax policies and the proposals emenating from Marx. Pikettys
denition of capital of course di¤ers from Marxs, who dened capital as the
means of production which are set in motion by a labourer who does not own
them, with the sole purpose of producing prot for their owner, who is not
expending labour to set these means of production in motion. For Piketty,
capital is "the sum total of all nonhuman assets that can be owned and ex-
changed in some market". In this case, assets in working class households
(e.g. furniture), which can be exchanged in the second-hand markets are also
capital. This of course raises problems with Pikettys construction of the
capital variable.
2. Piketty and classical political economy
2.1 Piketty on Ricardo
Before going into the detail of Pikettys analytical framework, it is important
that I do some house-keeping regarding the historical foundations of the ideas
contained in Pikettys book. In his "Introduction", Piketty makes a number
of claims regarding Malthus, Ricardo and Marx, which are dubious. These
claims potentially damage the contribution that Piketty would have made
to the study of Political Economy, as he transits from neoclassical theory to
classical political economy. I will at this point limit myself to the claims he
makes regarding Ricardo and Marx, but more about Marx.
On Ricardo, Piketty gives a short outline of the Ricardian growth model,
elements of which can be found in Pasinetti (1977) or even Samuelson (1978).
Piketty claims that: "Ricardo had no way of anticipating technological progress
of industrial growth in the years ahead" (p.6). Let me point out that Ricardo
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in many places does talk about technological progress. His analysis however,
assumes a given state of technology. Just like anyone who draws a graph
assumes "other things constant". The e¤ects of technological progress would
be to shift the Ricardian production function upwards.
If we look at Ricardos chapter 2 On Rent, he provides some detailed analysis
of the e¤ects of the application of new technologies on rent in agriculture.
He goes on to say: "It is undoubtedly true that the fall in the relative price
of raw produce, in consequence of the improvement in agriculture...would
naturally lead to increased accumulation; for prots of stock would be greatly
augmented...But improvements in agriculture are of two kinds: those which
increase the productive powers of the land and those which enable us, by
improving our machinery, to obtain produce with less labour" (p.54).
The e¤ects of these improvements on land, are to reduce rent and therefore,
these improvements are "injurious" to the landlords (See Ricardo, p.55). It
therefore follows that Ricardo was fully aware that persistent technological
progress would progressively lower the price of agricultural raw produce in
the long run and this process leads to a progressive reduction of rent on
land. This, from a Ricardian point of view, explains Pikettys nding of
"the collapse in the value of farmland".
Lastly in relation to Ricardo, we have to mention that Ricardo was very much
concerned about the e¤ects of technological progress on income distribution
and on the conditions of the various classes (landlords, capitalists and labour-
ers). While he initially thought technological progress lifts all boats, he later
recanted his views on the matter by writing chapter 31 On Machinery. In
that chapter, Ricardo shows that technological progress tends to injure the
workers. It is interesting that Piketty, in his basic solution to the social crisis
of capitalism proposes, on the basis of Solows 1956 neoclassical theory, that
policymakers must raise the growth rate on the basis of "durable technological
progress", as if such progress is class-neutral. I will return to this issue in sec-
tion 4 below.
2.2 Piketty on Marx
On Malthus, Ricardo and Marx, Piketty has this to say: "Malthus, Ricardo,
Marx and many others had been talking about inequalities for decades with-
out citing any sources whatsoever...now for the rst time, objective data were
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available..." (p.13). Yet, Piketty later states that: "Marx was also an assid-
uous reader of British parliamentary reports from the period 1820-1860...He
also used statistics derived from taxes imposed on prots from di¤erent
sources, which showed a very rapid increase in industrial prots in Britain
in the 1840s. Marx even triedin a very impressionistic fashion, to be true,
to make use of probate statistics in order to show that the largest British
fortunes had increased dramatically since the Napoleonic wars" (p.229).
Let us leave aside the fact that Piketty himself tries hard to shut down Marxs
use of statistics, how does Piketty then claim that Marx proceeded in his
analyses of inequality "without citing any sources whatsoever", if at the same
time Marx was "an assiduous reader of British parliamentary reports"? This
contradiction in Pikettys approach to Marx, reveals Pikettys pre-conceived
ideological bias against Marxs analysis. This is a problem for Pikettys
whole book, whose methodology, he claims, proceeds "by patiently searching
for facts and patterns and calmly analysing the economic, social and political
mechanisms that might explain them, [in order to] inform democratic debate
and focus attention on the right questions. It can help to redene the terms
of the debate, unmask preconceived or fraudulent notions, and subject all
positions to critical scrutiny" (p.3). How do we take this claim seriously if
Piketty himself fraudulently cites other authors, especially Marx?
Let me demonstrate that Piketty is incorrect in his claim that Marx did not
cite any sources of data whatsoever. In Capital I, Chapter 25, Section 3,
Marx uses income tax statistics from 1853 to 1864 as part of "illustrations
of the general law of capitalist accumulation", the law of progressive concen-
tration of wealth in the hands of the few. He reports that "The increase of
prots liable to income tax...in Great Britain from 1853 to 1864 amounted to
50.47%...that of the population during the same period to about 12%...The
augmentation of the rent of land subject to taxation...amounted for 1853 to
1864 to 38%" (Capital I, p.607).
Contrary to Pikettys claim that Marx talked about inequalities for decades
"without citing any sources whatsoever", Marx provides citations of his
sources for these statistics. One source is the various reports of the Commis-
sioners of Inland Revenue, which he mentions in the footnotes of the pages I
cite here. There are numerous citations of sources that Piketty could have
beneted from, to augment his series, had he read Marx. In addition, Marx
cites other authors of his day to illustrate and to argue his points.
5
Marx proceeds to show that "the accumulation of capital was attended at the
same time by its concentration and centralisation" (p.608). He uses statistics
from agriculture, from 1851 to 1861, to demonstrate his law: "from 1851 to
1861 the number of farms of less than 100 acres had fallen from 31 583 to 26
597, so that 5 016 had been thrown together into larger farms. From 1815 to
1825 no personal estate of more than £ 1000 000 came under the succession
duty; from 1825 to 1855, 8 did...The centralisation will however be best seen
from a short analysis of the Income Tax Schedule D, in the years 1864 to
1865...."
Marx refers to a certain Mr John Bright, who asserted that "150 landlords
own half of England", and says that this assertion has never been refuted.
In subsequent pages, Marx refers to the statement by the "Registrar-General
of the British people" who said: "Rapidly as the population has increased, it
has not kept pace with the progress of industry and wealth". Marx cites the
source of this statement to be the "census of England and Wales" (p.591).
Marx further cites the contradictory speeches by William Gladstone and one
Professor Fawcett.
Though I cannot claim that Marx was the rst to use income tax statistics
as a method to illustrate inequalities, it is very obvious that Kuznets owes
a lot to those who came before him, including Marx. Marx used income
tax statistics and other sources almost 100 years before Kuznets. These
statistics, as Marx consistently cites, come from Income Tax Schedules, and
they are therefore o¢ cial statistics of his time.
It is therefore problematic for Piketty to claim, regarding Kuznetss 1953
book, that: "Now, for the rst time, objective data were available...What is
more the work of compilation was extremely well documented: the weighty
volume that Kuznets published in 1953 revealed his sources and methods in
the most minute detail, so that every calculation can be reproduced". I do
not nd Marx to have not done the same as Kuznets, reading his data in
Chapter 25 of Capital I, for example, unless Piketty claims that the sources
that Marx cites are fraudulent or not objective. Furthermore, Marxs calcu-
lations are fairly basic and straightforward, contrary to what Piketty implies.
It would therefore seem that Piketty made claims about Marx without having
read him. This is not the best way to inform democratic debate about such
an important issue as inequality. It would therefore be advisable, in the next
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edition of his book, for Piketty to withdraw these statements about Ricardo
and Marx. This would not lower the value of the book, but enhance it.
3. Piketty on the rise of capitalism and imperialism
In p.7, Piketty discusses the context within which Marx and Ricardo wrote:
"The most striking fact of the day was the misery of the industrial proletariat.
Despite the growth of the economy, or perhaps in part because of it, and
because, as well, of the vast rural exodus owing to both population growth
and increasing agricultural productivity, workers crowded into urban slums".
The trouble with this sort of statement is that it is not consistent with
historical evidence. Piketty claims that, at the dawn of capitalism, workers
crowded into urban slums because of the rural exodus that was caused by
population growth and increasing agricultural productivity. He ignores the
fact that the rural population was forcibly removed from the land to make
way for the rise of the capitalist farmers and industrial capitalists.
In Capital I Chapter 26Chapter 30, Marx details the process of the emer-
gence of the industrial proletariat. It turns out that this process is not as
peaceful as Piketty presents it. Marx writes that the history of this process
"is written in the annals of mankind in letters of blood and re" (Capital I,
p.669). This process involved the expropriation of the agricultural popula-
tion from the land, which led to "a mass of proletarians being hurled on the
labour market by the breaking-up of bands of feudal retainers" (Capital I,
p.672). In this process the state played a central role, through enforcement
of legislation that overnight turned the agricultural population into property-
less people, who could only survive by selling their labour-power in return
for wages.
Then after the creation of this propertyless class, whose sole means of survival
was wage income, the state proceeded to pass legislation which forced down
wages. Marx chronicles how this happened in Capital I Chapter 28. He
records similar legislation in England, France and the Netherlands. To show
that the state was an instrument of the rising capitalist class at the expense of
the expropriated, Marx quotes Linguets reference to Adam Smith in p.689:
"Whenever the legislature attempts to regulate di¤erences between masters
and workmen, its counsellors are always the masters". It is therefore not
true that the rural exodus was driven by population growth and agricultural
productivity.
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In p.120122, Piketty discusses the rise and fall of foreign capital. In this
context he talks about the e¤ect of colonialism: "In other words, the rest
of the world worked to increase consumption by the colonial powers. This
may be shocking. But it is essential to realise that the goal of accumulating
assets abroad by way of commercial surpluses and colonial appropriations
was precisely to be in a position later to run trade decits...The advantage
of owning things is that one can continue to consume and accumulate more
without having to work...". Piketty continues to note that in the wake of
decolonisation: "both France and Great Britain found themselves with net
foreign assets close zero" (p.121). This leaves an incorrect impression that
decolonisation wiped out the colonial posessions of France and Britain.
Throughout the book, when he discusses the phenomenon of a fall in British
and French foreign assets, Piketty does mention the rise of the US as a global
power (see p.155 for example). However, he does not link the entry of the
US as a new global power to the changes in the net foreign assets of France
and Britain. While it is true that some decolonisation, particularly those
similar to China, Korea, Vietnam, later India, parts of Africa, etc. led to
genuine nationalisation of colonial property, the decolonisation process led
to the emergence of neo-colonialism, where the colonial powers continued to
control the economies of their colonies while the colonies look as if they are
politically independent.
This mechanism was long foreseen by Lenin in his Imperialism: The High-
est Stage of Capitalism: "Since we are speaking of colonial policy in the
epoch, of capitalist imperialism, it must be observed that nance capital and
its corresponding foreign policy, which reduces itself to the struggle of the
Great Powers for the economic and political division of the world, give rise
to a number of transitional forms of state dependence. Typical of this epoch
is not only the two main groups of countries: those owning colonies, and
colonies, but also the diverse forms of dependent countries which, o¢ cially,
are politically independent, but in fact, are enmeshed in the net of nancial
and diplomatic dependence. We have already referred to one form of depen-
dence the semicolony. An example of another is provided by Argentina"
(Collected Works 22, p.263).
The post World War II period ushered in a new conguration of power rela-
tions within global capital. The US became the leading force, whereas before
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this role was played by Britain. As Lenin says, imperialism leads to wars an
continual redivision of the world among the global powers. The stake that the
US received after World War II was largely taken from Britain and France.
This point is made by Nabudere (1978): "When Europe emerged from the
second World War it was badly torn up with its economies destroyed...The
US came out of the war the strongest capitalist power. Its GNP rose by
100% in ve years between 1939 and 1944; what the Alllies were losing by
waging the war, the US was gaining. Thus whereas the US gold reserves
were $4 billion in 1932, they rose to $20.6 billion in 1958, as compared to
the combined gold and dollar reserves of Britain which rose from $0.6 billion
to $3.1 billion, in the same period...the US share of world capital exports in
1914 were 6.3%, by 1930 35.3%, and 59.1% in 1960...France and Germany
lost ground drastically from 39.5% to 11% and nally to 5.8%" (p.144).
In Part 4 of his book, Nabudere provides more data to illustrate the rise of
the US and how it cannibalised asset shares of the European powers after
World War II. The story about net foreign assets is very important, especially
for developing and emerging market economies. However, the problem with
the way Piketty presents the story is that he does not recognise that what
he sees as near-zero net foreign assets among the superpowers reects the
redivision of the world among themselves. That is to say, among themselves,
no one will "consume and accumulate more without having to work" at the
expense of someone else. In fact, there is interpenetration of ownership
within these superpowers so that, for example, US capital owns colonial
posessions through owning French capital. Piketty promises to extend the
net foreign asset story and his whole analysis to developing and emerging
market countries. I am sure the story will be quite di¤erent.
The role of foreign trade and imperialism in mitigating the crises of capital-
ism within the imperialist centres is well-documented, beginning with Marx
in Capital III, Lenin, Luxemburg, Grossmann and many others. What is
important is that, while indeed Piketty mentions colonialism and net foreign
assets, he does not explain the precise mechanisms through which these phe-
nomena modify the operation of the general law of capitalist accumulation.
For example in Capital III, Marx shows that the export of capital is one of
the inuences that can act to counter the tendency of  to rise. The inten-
sity of the contradictions of capitalism can be di¤used and shifted around the
globe, away from imperialist centres, through the export of capital. However,
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as capital rapidly covers the entire world market, wars of redivision among
the super-powers become necessary as one super-power shoves its own con-
tradictions in anothers territory. It is in this context, the context where
the BRICS are also emerging as an autonomous force in the world capitalist
system, also engaged in shoving o¤ its own contradictions to others, that
the contradictions of Capital in the Twenty-First Century would be further
intensied on the world scale.
4. The laws of motion of capitalism
4.1 Marxs general law of capitalist accumulation and the tendency
of the rate of prot to fall
For Marx and the classical political economists such as Ricardo, the subject
of political economy is the analysis of the laws of motion of the capitalist
system. After a thorough analysis of the process of capitalist accumulation,
Marx states what he calls the General Law of Capitalist Accumulation:
"The greater the social wealth, the functioning of capital, the extent and
energy of its growth, and therefore, also the absolute mass of the proletariat
and the productiveness of its labour, the greater is the industrial reserve
army. The same forces which develop the expansive power of capital, develop
also the labour power at its disposal. The relative mass of the industrial
reserve army increases therefore with the potential energy of wealth. But
the greater is this reserve army in proportion to the active labour army, the
greater is o¢ cial pauperism. This is the absolute general law of capitalist
accumulation. Like all other laws it is modied in its working by many
circumstances..." (Capital I, p.603).
Marx further states the law as follows: "The higher the productiveness of
labour, the greater is the pressure of the labourers on the means of em-
ployment, the more precarious therefore, becomes their condition of exis-
tence...this law rivets the labourer to capital more rmly than the wedges of
the Vulcan did Prometheus to the rock. It establishes an accumulation of
misery, corresponding with accumulation of capital. Accumulation of wealth
at one pole is, therefore, at the same time accumulation of misery, agony of
toil slavery, ignorance, brutality, mental degradation, at the opposite pole..."
(Capital I, p.604).
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The implication of this law to the long run prospects of the capitalist sys-
tem are detailed by Marx in Capital III, Part III: The Law of the Tendency
of the Rate of Prot to Fall. This law, as Marx explains, states that the
capitalist mode of production "produces...a continuously rising organic com-
position of the total capital. The immediate result of this is that the rate
of surplus value, at the same or even a rising, degree of labour exploitation,
is represented by a continually falling general rate of prot...The progressive
tendency of the general rate of prot to fall is, therefore, just an expression
peculiar to the capitalist mode of production of the progressive development
of the social productivity of labour" (Capital III, p.213).
These two versions are just expressions of one and the same phenomenon,
in other words, the law of the tendency of the rate of prot to fall is just
another expression for the general law of capitalist accumulation. Let me
now turn to Pikettys claims about Marx regarding the laws of capitalism.
4.2 Piketty on Marx on technological progress
Piketty repeats the fraudulent claim that Marx ignored technological progress.
In his introduction, he says: "Like his predecessors, Marx totally neglected
the possibility of durable technological progress, and steadily increasing pro-
ductivity, which is a force that can to some extent serve as a counterweight
to the process of accumulation and concentration of private capital" (p.10).
On the basis of this false premise, Piketty then says: "My conclusions are less
apocalyptic than those implies by Marxs principle of innite accumulation
and perpetual divergence (since Marxs theory implicitly relies on a strict
assumption of zero productivity growth over the long run" (p.27). Piketty
repeats this claim in his discussion of Marxs law of the tendency of the rate
of prot to fall, in this instance he relies on Solows 1956 model (see his
acknowledgement in p.228).
Now Solows model is based on the Cobb-Douglas production function, which
assumes constant income shares. This production function has been amply
shown by radical scholars to be no more than a national accounting identity
(see Shaikh, 1974). Solows theory says long run growth is determined by the
growth rate of productivity and the growth rate of the population. Yet in
the same breadth, Piketty criticises the Cobb-Douglass production function,
11
for its assumption of constant factor shares (see p.217220). These contra-
dictions in Pikettys book, this double-speak, should be understood within
the context of Pikettys attempt to transit from Solow to Marx.
I will now demonstrate that Pikettys conclusion about the long run dynamics
of the capitalist system must therefore be rejected, because they are based
on a false premise. If we read Marxs Chapter 25 of Capital I, we repeatedly
encounter statements that link the rise in capital intensity to the increase in
productivity. For example, Marx approvingly cites Adam Smith as follows:
"Once given the general basis of the capitalistsic system, then, in the course
of accumulation, a point is reached at which development of the productivity
of social labour becomes the most powerful lever of accumulation".
I will not go into the many quotations, but I simply invite the reader to read
Section 2 and Section 3 of Capital I Chapter 25. I also refer the reader
to the above quotations from Marx regarding the general law of capitalist
accumulation and the law of the tendency of the rate of prot to fall. Marx
makes numerous statements about durable technological progress, without
which the general law of capitalist accumulation would not operate. In fact,
without technological progress, the capitalist system simply generates an
accumulation cycle around a stable unemployment and labour share, as rst
modelled by Goodwin (1967).
Piketty seems not to have read Marx because, for Marx, long-term, durable
technological progress is the same as rising organic composition of capital,
or capital intensity. Marx does not cease to take the opportunity to explain
that rising capital intensity of production in turn raises labour productiv-
ity. Therefore a steady rise in capital intensity (Pikettys ), drives labour
productivity and it is this type of productivity growth that creates a long-
term structural crisis for the capitalist system. For example, as I mentioned
above, he says: "The progressive tendency of the general rate of prot to fall
is, therefore, just an expression peculiar to the capitalist mode of production
of the progressive development of the social productivity of labour" (Capital
III, p.213). As any reader of Marx will know, what really tends to drive the
rate of prot down is rising capital intensity that is a function of capitalist
accumulation itself.
The whole point of this critique of Piketty is that Piketty has failed to see
that Marx actually formalised "endogenous growth theory". Capital ac-
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cumulation raises capital intensity and hence long run labour productivity
growth (Solows gA). This in turn leads to the long run tendency of the
rate of the rate of prot to fall and hence, to the fall in the long run growth
rate of the capitalist economy. Maito (2014), has shown this to be the case
empirically, using Pikettys own data.
4.3 Pikettys laws and the neoclassical contradiction
What Piketty presents as "laws of capitalism", are in fact the theory of
accumulation found in the works of classical political economists such as
Ricardo, Marx and the Cambridge growth theorists such as Robinson, Kaldor
and Pasinetti (see Shaikh, 1992). Pikettys laws are formulas whose left and
right hand sides can be interchanged. However, classical political economists
had a theory of causation of the variables that Piketty discusses in his book.
In short, one "law" is an equilibrium condition that says investment equals
savings and the other is simply a denition of the rate of prot.
More importantly though, while Piketty irts with classical growth theory,
his resort to neoclassical theory in order to avoid the fundamental Marxist
conclusion about the future of capitalism creates a contradiction in his an-
alytical framework. Specically, his assertion that g = gA + gn leads his
apparatus to fall apart, because this assumption implies that capital inten-
sity is constant in the long run, a view that is not borne out by his own data.
Let us get on with Pikettys laws, which are as follows:
 = r   (1)
 =
s
g
; (2)
where  is the capital share of income, r is the rate of prot on capital, s is
the savings rate, g is long run growth rate of the economy and  = K=Y is
the capital output ratio. I want to add to these Solows neoclassical "law"
of capitalist growth, upon which Piketty relies:
g = gA + gn (3)
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where gA is the growth rate of productivity, what Piketty calls "durable
technological progress", and gn is the growth rate of the labour force. It
follows naturally that, upon replacing g using eq.(3), we get:
 =
s
gA + gn
(4)
Pikettys doubts about Marxs apocalypse can be seen in eq.(4). In this
equation,  need not rise indenitely because gA (and gn) can rise, thereby
depressing . In a way, Piketty concludes, "Marx was wrong". However,
note that Marx, in Capital I Chapter 25, rejects the view that gn poses a
limit to capitalist accumulation, because rising capital intensity progressively
generates a surplus-population (the reserve army of the unemployed). To see
the validity of Marxs theory, just picture an economy with a rapid growth of
the labour force without capital accumulationthe results would be height-
ened poverty and unemployment, not rising economic growth, contrary to
the suggestions of the basic neoclassical model upon which Piketty relies.
I will now show that Pikettys laws express an equilibrium condition and
a denition, there are no two laws, as he claims. Less so are these "laws
of motion of capitalism" Also, there is a contradiction in his analytical
framework. To do this, I will revert to Marx and the classics. According to
Marx and others, the rate of capital accumulation is determined by the rate
of prot, because capitalists invest prots. Like Piketty I, for now, abstract
from depreciation. Therefore:

K = scP; (5)
where K is the capital stock,

K is the change in the capital stock, P is
aggregate prots, and 0 < sc < 1 is the savings propensity of the capitalist
class. Eq.(5) says that capitalist investment equals capitalist savings. Now,
let  be the share of prots in national income. It follows that P = Y ,
where Y is national income. Eq.(5) can be stated as:

K = scY; (6)
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Dividing by K both sides we get the rate of capital accumulation to be:
gk =
sc

; (7)
where gk =

K
K
. Eq.(7) is an equilibrium condition which says investment
equals capitalistssavings. The contradiction in Pikettys analytical frame-
work should by now be clear. Eq.(7) reveals that Pikettys s equals sc and
his g equals gk. He is back to the balanced growth path of Solow that he
criticises. Worse, if g = gk then  should be constant in the long run. This is
not borne out by Pikettys own data. What his data reveals is the tendency
of  to rise, and this rise is interrupted by wars, crises, and revolutions, or
what Shaikh (1992) refers to as "exogenous extraeconomic factors" (see the
disruption in the upward trend in  that occurred between 1914 and 1970,
e.g. gure 4.8, p.154).
Thus, by resorting to neoclassical theory, Piketty e¤ectively sets  to be
constant in the long run. His analytical framework is inconsistent with his
data because it means that the growth rate of wealth equals the growth rate
of income. Under this condition, there is no long run historical tendency
towards increasing wealth concentration in capitalism. Yet, Pikettys book
is concerned with capitalisms automatic generation of "arbitrary and unsus-
tainable inequalities" (p.1).
Furthermore, from Marx and the classics, we know that the rate of prot is
dened as:
r  P
K
: (8)
However, since P = Y; it follows that:
r =


(9)
That is why Pikettys "two laws" are simply an equilibrium condition and
a denition, because Piketty assumes that in the long run g = gk. While
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he acknowledges that: "The formula  = r   is a pure identity. It can be
applied to all societies in all periods of history, by denition" (p.52), Piketty
does not explain how such an "identity", which can apply in all modes of pro-
duction, becomes a law that is specic to the capitalist mode of production.
Although Piketty further confuses an "identity" with a "denition", his rea-
soning that this formula should be regarded as a law is, at best, conceptually
very weak.
Now, having revealed Pikettys "laws" for what they really are, I now proceed
to state them in the terms of classical political economy, assuming for now
that g = gk, as:
 =
sc
g
(10)
 = r  : (11)
It is quickly obvious that, upon substituting out  using eq.(11), the following
equation obtains:
g = scr; (12)
which is well-known in Marxist and post-Keynesian literature. Since sc is
less than 1, it follows that in the long run r > g. This shows that had
Piketty fully engaged with some Marxist and post-Keynesian literature, it
would have been fairly obvious that capitalism structurally reinforces the
concentration of wealth in the hands of those who already have it and the
rest of society will never catch up even if they accumulate all their incomes
at the rate g. His explanation of r > g in p.350361 is not convincing. For
example he claims that one reason for r > g in traditional societies is because
"these were low growth societies". This begs another question. Looking at
his Figure 10.10 in p.356, why is it that g > r in the era of wars, revolutions
and economic crises? The answer to this question lies in Marxs exposition
of the law of the tendency of the rate of prot to fall.
Now, only under "socialism", i.e. sc = 1 (which means capitalists are not
consuming, and therefore dead), do we have the maximum growth rate where
16
g = r (Pasinetti, 1962). Note that although Pasinettis "socialism" is supe-
rior to capitalism, it is nevertheless di¤erent from the concept that is more
aligned to Marxs, which explicitly incorporates the role of state-ownership
of the means of production. Having said this, I must point out that in fact
r > g as the condition for rising wealth concentration does not accurately
capture Marxs view. As I will show below, Marxs long run path of capitalist
development in fact assumes that gk > g, that is to say, scr > g.
5. Marxs law of the tendency of the rate of prot to fall through
rising 
Let me turn to Marxs theory. Piketty is worried about Marxs law of rising
, which produces an apocalypse and he wants to avoid it within an economy
dominated by the "forces of private property and competition" (p.532). Now,
two things must happen to avoid Marxs law from eq.(7). One thing is that 
must fall. However this means the prot share must fall in favour of workers
(this is a move to the left, towards some kind of social democracy). Another
thing is to raise the growth rate of long term productivity gA. Piketty argues
for both. The reduction of  will be done through tax and the raising of
gA will be done through "di¤usion of knowledge", education, policy and so
forth. However, Piketty is unaware that in capitalism gA is driven by rising
capital intensity in the long run, as pointed out by Marx.
Piketty claims that: "Marxist analysis emphasizes the falling rate of prota
historical prediction that turned out to be quite wrong, although it contains
some interesting intuition" (p.52). I have mentioned that Marxs theory of
long term productivity growth implies that long-term productivity growth is
completely determined by the growth rate of capital intensity. To formalise
Marxs theory of the rate of technological progress in a simple way, we use
the following equation:
gA =  (gk   g) ; (13)
where  > 0. Note that eq.(13) is a statement of "endogenous growth the-
ory", there is no other "exogenous" factor that drives long term productivity
than the rise in capital intensity; all technological progress expresses, and
nds expression, in the rising capital intensity of production. Technological
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progress is therefore tied to "the constant generation of the surplus popu-
lation", whose function is to keep wages "in a rut that corresponds to the
wants of capital" (Capital I, p.689). It is not a class-neutral process. The
growth rate of output is determined by the rate of technological progress and
the rate of capital accumulation. Therefore we have:
g = gA + gk; (14)
where 0 <  < 1. Substracting gk from both sides of eq.(14) and substituting
gA away using eq.(13) we have the following relation:
(gk   g) =

1  
1 + 

gk (15)
Let b = (gk   g) denote the growth rate of capital intensity. Eq.(15) can then
be written as follows:



=  gk; (16)
where  =
 
1 
1+

. Eq.(16) is the law of motion for , which states that the
growth rate of capital intensity is determined by the rate of capital accu-
mulation. As long as the rate of capital accumulation is positive, capital
intensity will rise and this, according to eq.(9) will lead to a fall in the rate
of prot. Upon introducing the rate of depreciation in eq.(7), I write the law
of motion for capital intensity to be:

 =  (sc  ) (17)
What comes out of this is a dynamic law for the evolution of , which under
capitalism always implies that

 > 0, i.e.  must be persistently rising, as
long as (sc  ) > 0. Note that, as pointed out by Marx in Capital III,
p.236, the e¤ect of depreciation  on capital accumulation moderates the rise
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in , and hence, as I will show,  moderates the fall in the rate of prot.
Indeed, at a certain stage in the increase of , write-o¤s, write-downs and
destruction of capital are ways in which the capitalist system raises , but
these serve more to decrease  so that the rate of prot recovers. It should
be noted though that rising depreciation chokes o¤ the system by narrowing
the gap (sc  ). So, it is the sudden reduction in  that really leads to
the recovery.
Nevertheless, in relation to depreciation, Marx explains in Capital III, p.252
that: "It is evident, however, this depreciation of old capital could not occur
without a struggle", as one capitalist seeks to shift the losses to another. This
never-ending struggle makes  to continue to rise and  to be suppressed; the
rate of prot continues to fall. Ultimately, the capitalist system reaches a
point where

 = 0. At that point (sc  ) = 0 and all growth ceases. At
what point will the capitalist system absolutely enter a crisis? Put another
way, at what level of the rate of prot does the capitalist system grind to a
halt?
In Capital III p.251, Marx states this condition as follows: "There would
be absolute overproduction of capital as soon as additional capital for the
purposes of capitalist production=0". In other words, at this point, gk = 0.
He elaborates this point to show that this is equivalent to saying that the
growth rate of the volume, or mass, of prots is zero (Shaikh, 1992). So the
absolute crisis of capitalism occurs when rc = =sc, where rc is the rate of
prot at the point of absolute overproduction of capital. As the capitalist
system approches this point (and perhaps surpasses it), economic crises, wars,
repressions, revolutions etc. would take place, as we observe from Pikettys
own data.
Eq.(17) is precisely Marxs law of rising capital intensity, which is di¤er-
ent from Pikettys eq.(2), which Piketty incorrectly calls "dynamic" (see for
example Piketty, p.187 and p.228). Eq.(17) is truly a "law of motion" of cap-
italist accumulation, a law of motion . It is not a static equilibrium relation
between  and other variables. In his formulations however, Piketty abstracts
from depreciation, i.e.  = 0. Solving for eq.(17), having abstracted from
depreciation, to follow Pikettys logic, I obtain:
 = 0 +  sct; (18)
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where t denotes time and 0 is the constant of integration. Eq.(18) directly
implies a falling rate of prot. To see this, substitute out  from eq.(8),
using eq.(18) to get:
r =

0 +  sct
: (19)
In the spirit of Shaikh (1992), the denominator (0 +  sct) approaches
innity as time progresses, while uctuates between 0 and 1 because it is the
prot share in total income. These dynamic processes lead to an inexorable
fall in the rate of prot brought about by the increase in productivity, which
Piketty incorrectly claims is absent in Marxs theory. The crucial parametric
assumption in Marxs theory which links the law of rising  to the law of
the tendency of the rate of prot to fall is that 0 <  < 1. This parametric
assumption is an established empirical regularity.
Given that  is limited to uctuate between 0 and 1, we can assume that it is
constant in the long run (an illustrative assumption made by Marx in Capital
III, part III). However to avoid the unnecessary criticism of this, let us put
 = 1, so that capitalists take all the income as prots (which is unrealistic).
Then it is obvious that r will fall at an approximate rate  sc. I have thus
shown that, as Maito correctly observes, "protability in capitalism tends to
fall despite, or even with, productivity increases. This is a basic conclusion
of Marx´s Capital. And the evidence...not only refutes Piketty´s arguments
but other authors, really a huge majority even within Marxism".
Let us now return to Pikettys explanation of Marxs "principle of innite
accumulation". Piketty says, about Marx: " In fact, his principal conclusion
was what one might call the principle of innite accumulation,that is, the
inexorable tendency for capital to accumulate and become concentrated in
ever fewer hands, with no natural limit to the process. This is the basis
of Marxs prediction of an apocalyptic end to capitalism: either the rate
of return on capital would steadily diminish (thereby killing the engine of
accumulation and leading to violent conict among capitalists), or capitals
share of national income would increase indenitely (which sooner or later
would unite the workers in revolt). In either case, no stable socioeconomic
or political equilibrium was possible" (p.9).
20
I have shown that indeed capitalist accumulation implies an increasing ,
i.e. concentration of capital. As a mathematical ratio  has no natural
limit. However in Marxs view, as an expression of the development of the
productive forces, the increase in  has limits and those limits are imposed by
the relations of production, which are captured by the expression (sc  ).
That is why Marx says: "The real barrier of capitalist production is capital
itself " (Capital III, p.250). In addition, in Marxs model, capitals share
cannot increase indenitely, because as a share, it uctuates between 0 and 1,
and if indeed it increases, there is an upper limit of 1. Pikettys interpretation
of Marx is therefore incorrect.
Given the above results, it is clear that Pikettys claim that long run durable
technological progress can serve as a counterweight to Marxs law of the
tendency of the rate of prot to fall does not hold. This is so because tech-
nological progress under capitalism is determined by the growth of capital
intensity of production.
6. Pikettys solution versus Marxs solution
One of the most cited of Pikettys solutions to arrest the persistent increase in
 is to levy a tax on income, capital and consumption (p.494). Clearly, these
are meant to be redistributive, i.e. shifting income, wealth and consumption
to the poor from the rich. The problem with Pikettys taxes is that they are
not meant to abolish the social domination of "the forces of private property
and competition" (p.532). As I will show below, these taxes will not solve
the fundamental crisis of the capitalist system as long as private property
dominates.
6.1 A tax on prots
6.1.1 Pikettys solution
Let us implement Pikettys tax on income, in this instance the tax is levied
on prots. Note that, from eq.(7), having introduced depreciation, the rate
of capital accumulation would be:
gk =   + sc(1   p)r: (20)
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where 0 <  p < 1 is the tax rate on prots. The impact of this tax rate is to
lower gk the growth rate of capital so that the gap gk > g narrows. However
the problem is that, as long as capitalists control the accumulation process
within the economy, this policy intervention implies that the long run growth
rate will slow down, since the rate of capital accumulation is dominated by
the forces of private property. I have mentioned in section 5 that  must
be persistently rising as long as (sc  ) > 0. Pikettys tax on prots
amounts to reducing the expression [scc(1   p)  ], in order to arrest
the increase in . However, the tax rate hastens the arrival of the crisis.
In addition, since the rate of prot tends to inexorably fall, the policy inter-
vention that Piketty suggests also means that:
rc =

sc(1   p) : (21)
Thus, while Pikettys solution narrows the gap gk > g, it brings forward the
crisis point. That is to say, the capitalist system quickly enters the crisis
because the crisis rate of prot is higher, and it slows down the speed at
which the rate of prots falls. The speed at which the rate of prot falls
would be  sc(1    p). Pikettys solution therefore does not resolve the
Marxist apocalypse precisely because it still "relies on the forces of private
property and competition".
6.1.2 Marxs solution
Let us, as an alternative introduce a more radical, Marxist solution. Here,
the state participates directly in the process of capital accumulation, having
conscated part of private property. From a Marxist point of view, it is not
enough for the state simply to take ownership of the means of production
from private owners. What is crucial is that, upon nationalising, the state
has to plan so as to keep  constant. This is what Marxists mean when they
talk about the "control of the development of the productive forces".
The distinction between state socialist ownership and private capitalist own-
ership therefore is that under state socialism

 = 0, without a crisis. There-
fore, part of gk is controlled by the state to the extent that the state itself
22
owns the means of production. In this case, the rate of technological progress
becomes:
gA =  [(1  ) (gpk   gp) + ggA] ; (22)
where gpk is the rate of accumulation of private capital, g
p is the growth rate
of private sector output, ggA is the rate of technological progress in the state-
owned sectors,  is the share of state capital in total capital and (1  ) is the
share of private capital in total capital. One can think of  as "the degree
of nationalisation" of capital. The rst term inside the square bracket is
technological progress due to private capitalist accumulation and the second
term is due to state capital accumulation. The latter is determined through
state policy to be ggA.
Note that within the state-owned sectors, the state keeps its capital in-
tensity constant, so that (ggk   gg) = 0. This implies that (gk   g) =
(1  ) (gpk   gp). Using this fact eq.(15) becomes:
(gk   g) =  


1 + 

ggA +

1  
1 + 

gk (23)
Stating the law of accumulation in terms of  I obtain:



=   


1 + 

ggA +  

1  
1 + 

gk; (24)
To see clearly the role of socialist state-ownership, substitute out gk using
eq.(20) and express the rate of prot in terms of eq.(9) to get:

 =   


1 + 

ggA + 

1  
1 + 

 +  

1  
1 + 

s: (25)
In eq.(25), s and  are the savings rate and the prot share respectively,
for the whole economy. In this setup, the condition (s  ) > 0 can
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exist without the economy experiencing a rising  as long as the degree of
nationalisation  is su¢ ciently large and the state su¢ ciently sets ggA. It
follows that for  to be constant, i.e.

 = 0, the state can, by controlling ggA
and , set:
 =
(1  ) s
ggA +  (1  )
(26)
Lastly, note that state socialism does not require write downs, writes o¤s and
the destruction of capital in order to recover the protability of the system.
Even if  = 0, the fact that  > 0 implies that the system can be stabilised
as long as the state ensures that ggA is positive. In other words, the state
must ensure that it contributes to technological progress, of course in a way
that is not tied to capital intensity as in the capitalist case. Otherwise, once
the state behaves in a capitalist way, the dynamic of rising capital intensity
will set in motion a falling rate of prot and crisis. Similarly, setting  = 0
through privatisation would simply lift  and set in motion the general law
of capitalist accumulation.
Note that in the above analysis, I have not included progressive taxation yet.
This is not to say that such taxation is not important. What I intend to
show is that such a tax is inadequate to address the dynamic of capitalism
towards increasing wealth concentration and crisis, if it is not complemented
by the more powerful measure of state socialist ownership of the means of
production.
6.2 A tax on capital?
Piketty also proposes a tax on capital in order to arrest the growth of wealth.
However a tax on capital will simply modify capital intensity so that there
is e = (1    c). This form of tax, alters the rate of capital accumulation
to be:
gk =  (1   c) + sc
(1   c) (27)
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The rate of capital accumulation rises as  c, the tax rate on capital, increases.
The policy does not interfere with the law of capitalist accumulation, which
is altered to be:



=  

 (1   c) + sc
(1   c)

; (28)
Therefore, the tax on capital will simply accelerate the growth of  and
hasten the fall in the rate of prot, thereby bringing the economy faster into
a crisis. Once again, the policy of setting  > 0, i.e. of nationalisation and
at the same time ensuring that ggA > 0 in a manner that is not related to
capital intensity o¤ers a superior outcome.
Once again, this is not to say that Pikettys proposal should not be supported.
Indeed such a proposal is progressive. Nevertheless, as before, unless this
proposal is complemented with the more powerful measure of state socialist
ownership of the means of production, it is likely to lead to crisis.
7. Conclusion
There is no doubt that Pikettys Capital in the Twenty-First Century has
raised the discussions about the progress of wealth and inequality to a higher
level. This is encouraging particularly because Piketty is an author that is
well-known in the dominant paradigm in the economics profession. Piketty
is modest to admit upfront that the "answers contained herein are imperfect
and incomplete" (p.1). This must be welcomed. Indeed, social science,
particularly economics, can learn a lot by examining the wealth of data that
Piketty and his colleagues have assembled for humanity to learn better ways
of organising its societies in a manner that is equitable.
However, there are claims that Piketty makes about Ricardo and Marx that
can potentially damage the ability of his book to open a genuinely democratic
and sustained debate about inequality. While claiming that these authors
present interesting insights and intuitions, he at the same time cancels them
out by grossly misrepresenting their views. This practice, which is found
throughout his book, weakens the book as a potential source of ideas that
can inform policy and theoretical developments within the academy.
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At another level, the content of Pikettys analysis is awed. This must be
taken within the context where Piketty had already, in p.1 of his book, admit-
ted that his solutions are imperfect and incomplete. His view of the genesis
of capitalism ies in the face of well-documented historical facts, found in
his predecessors book: Capital. Likewise, his periodisation of capitalism
through the evolution of , while very useful, fails to see changes in the poles
of hegemony within the imperialist powers. For example, he does not link
the "decrease" in British and French net foreign assets to the rise of the US
as a global power. In this connection, he has no concept of neo-colonialism.
I have attempted to show that Pikettys proposed tax policies to regulate
capital so that the Marxist apocalypse is avoided, though very progressive,
are not su¢ cient. In some instances, as in the tax on capital ownership,
these policies can accelerate the capitalist crisis. I have shown that, as long
capital accumulation is controlled and dominated by the forces of private
property, a positive rate of capital accumulation implies an increase in the
centralisation and concentration of capital and hence, a persistent fall in the
rate of prot, even if a tax is in place. Such a fall in the rate of prot,
ultimately results in a crisis where the capitalist system absolutely grinds to
a halt and capital is destroyed.
Only in the case of state socialism, i.e. where the state owns a substantial
portion of the means of production and it regulates technical progress in a
manner that is not related to capital intensity, does the economic system
avoid the crisis that is so well articulated by Marx. Nevertheless, in so far
as part of the economy remains in private hands, the privately-owned part
will face a gradual fall in the rate of prot, which will necessitate that the
socialist state gradually raises its ownership towards 100% in order to limit
the crisis emanating from private capitalist ownership.
In this review, I have not taken up the issue of economies that are dominated
by imperialism and how imperialist economies use these to postpone the cri-
sis of protability. Nevertheless, the model of Marxist crisis that I have put
forward above provides straightfoward implications for economies dominated
by imperialism. For example, the outow of prots from those economies
modies the model so that (sc  ) > 0 is required for increased growth,
where (1  ) is the share of prots that are repatriated to the imperialist
centre. Consequently, economies that are dominated by imperialism require
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a high , i.e. high rates of exploitation and hence high levels of income
inequality, in order for them to sustain high rates of capital accumulation.
Otherwise, these economies are more crisis-prone and will tend to experience
low growth rates than their imperialist counterparts. Once again, this ob-
servation shows that the "nationalisation of the economy", i.e. the limits to
foreign ownership, are important to sustain accumulation in these economies.
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